Social Normativity Without Realism: A Fictionalist Challenge
I challenge forms of social normativism that treat social normative entities—deontic statuses, deontic powers, and social norms—as indispensable to the explanation of action. I distinguish two roles these entities are said to play: causal and justificatory. Against the causal role, I argue that every causal explanation invoking social normative entities has a corresponding explanation that does not. Against the justificatory role, I argue that social scientists can adopt a methodological fictionalist stance toward justificatory explanations without thereby incurring ontological commitment. Realists therefore owe an account of why ontological commitment remains necessary for explanation.
Authors
- Erim Bakkal
Institutions
- University of California, Irvine (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Philosophy of the Social Sciences
- Published
- 2026-11-14
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931261505199
- Primary Topic
- Critical Realism in Sociology
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00