Decisions, Normative Powers, and Practical Situations
Abstract How do our decisions bear on our reasons for action? Raz holds that decision-making is a way of exercising our normative powers to create reasons for ourselves. Normative powers have been on the rise in moral and legal philosophy. Scanlon is an exception to this trend, holding that on source-externalism the normativity of decisions can be explained simply in virtue of the changes they can bring about in our practical situation. However, I argue that Scanlon’s account and Kolodny’s subsequent supplementation are wanting. In response, I propose a shift of attention to the deliberative conditions under which our earlier deciding self can consider the merits of a case compared to our future acting self. On this basis, I develop a new situational account that lies in the improvement to our future choice in combination with the costs of revisiting the issue. Hence, I conclude that normative powers are unnecessary for explaining the normativity of decisions.
Authors
- Andreas Vassiliou (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6532-7301)
Institutions
- University of Oxford (GB)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Law and Philosophy
- Published
- 2026-11-14
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-026-09601-7
- Primary Topic
- Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00