Decisions, Normative Powers, and Practical Situations

Abstract How do our decisions bear on our reasons for action? Raz holds that decision-making is a way of exercising our normative powers to create reasons for ourselves. Normative powers have been on the rise in moral and legal philosophy. Scanlon is an exception to this trend, holding that on source-externalism the normativity of decisions can be explained simply in virtue of the changes they can bring about in our practical situation. However, I argue that Scanlon’s account and Kolodny’s subsequent supplementation are wanting. In response, I propose a shift of attention to the deliberative conditions under which our earlier deciding self can consider the merits of a case compared to our future acting self. On this basis, I develop a new situational account that lies in the improvement to our future choice in combination with the costs of revisiting the issue. Hence, I conclude that normative powers are unnecessary for explaining the normativity of decisions.

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Publication Details

Journal
Law and Philosophy
Published
2026-11-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-026-09601-7
Primary Topic
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Decisions, Normative Powers, and Practical Situations

Andreas Vassiliou
Law and Philosophy
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
article

Decisions, Normative Powers, and Practical Situations

Andreas Vassiliou
article en

Abstract

Abstract How do our decisions bear on our reasons for action? Raz holds that decision-making is a way of exercising our normative powers to create reasons for ourselves. Normative powers have been on the rise in moral and legal philosophy. Scanlon is an exception to this trend, holding that on source-externalism the normativity of decisions can be explained simply in virtue of the changes they can bring about in our practical situation. However, I argue that Scanlon’s account and Kolodny’s subsequent supplementation are wanting. In response, I propose a shift of attention to the deliberative conditions under which our earlier deciding self can consider the merits of a case compared to our future acting self. On this basis, I develop a new situational account that lies in the improvement to our future choice in combination with the costs of revisiting the issue. Hence, I conclude that normative powers are unnecessary for explaining the normativity of decisions.

Law and Philosophy
University of Oxford (GB)
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
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