Talk is cheap? Rhetorical nationalism, signal congruity, and government support
This study examines the effectiveness of firms’ rhetorical nationalism in securing R&D subsidies from governments. As signal receivers, government agencies require more than rhetorical signals when assessing firms, given their responsibility for allocating public resources. Drawing on signaling theory, we argue that the effectiveness of rhetorical nationalism depends on signal congruity within a firm’s signal portfolio, that is, the alignment between rhetorical and substantive signals. Using a sample of Chinese high-tech firms, the findings show that rhetorical nationalism is positively associated with R&D subsidies when firms simultaneously engage in philanthropic activities. Conversely, when firms engage in financial misconduct, the effect of rhetorical nationalism weakens, as the misalignment between rhetoric and actions reduces the credibility of the nationalist narrative. This study has implications for signaling theory and organizational nationalism research.
Authors
- Xuchang Chen (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0597-4352)
- Jiarong Li
Institutions
- University of Reading (GB)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Asia Pacific Journal of Management
- Published
- 2026-11-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-026-10201-1
- Primary Topic
- Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00