Conceptual Partitioning and Scientific Phenomena: Epistemology for Foundational Cosmology
Philosophy‑of‑cosmology literature commonly presupposes a fixed inventory of scientific phenomena, for which competing theories offer alternative explanations. This paper challenges that presupposition. Drawing on the data‑phenomenon distinction, long‑standing debates over theory‑ladenness, and existing categorical work within cosmological methodology, this article argues that discrete scientific phenomena are not pre‑given objects ready‑made to be simply extracted from physical reality. Instead, they are demarcated, partitioned and classified by explicit or implicit conceptual partitioning schemes operating upon continuous causal flux. Terminological note: This work avoids the figurative coinage “conceptual grid”, which risks evoking geometric lattices or computational meshes. The expression phenomenal‑partitioning conceptual scheme is adopted instead, emphasizing the core function of boundary‑drawing over spatial imagery. Two kinds of theoretical conflict are distinguished: disputes over rival explanations for a shared set of phenomena, and deeper‑level fractures where competing phenomenal‑partitioning conceptual schemes produce partially non‑overlapping inventories of phenomena. In cosmology — a field largely deprived of controlled laboratory experiments and reliant exclusively on passively received cosmic signals — this second form of fracture helps explain long‑running scholarly disputes that cannot be straightforwardly adjudicated by observational data alone. Even as observational instruments improve in sensitivity and dataset size, disagreements rooted at the level of phenomenal inventory may persist, because parties do not fully agree on what requires explanation in the first place. This analysis does not endorse social constructivism: raw instrumental signals are physically real and theory‑independent. Nevertheless, phenomenal‑partitioning conceptual schemes remain empirically constrained; any revised scheme must give a coherent account of robust phenomena recognised under earlier frameworks. It cannot arbitrarily discard well‑supported empirical effects merely to evade explanatory pressure. Supplementary meta‑criteria for evaluating first‑principle proposals are derived. The paper identifies a neglected layer of epistemic risk: assessing theoretical frameworks ought to include reflective examination of the conceptual boundaries that define what qualifies as a scientific phenomenon in the first place. Such reflective practice is especially vital for foundational cosmology, where experimental intervention is unavailable and evidential reasoning depends heavily on sorting superimposed astrophysical and cosmological signals.
Authors
- Huiqiao Cao (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-1826-6135)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-13
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24202930
- Primary Topic
- Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Type
- preprint