Justification and Integrated Illegality: An Economic Framework for Criminal Law and Competition Law

Abstract This paper builds a common welfare architecture for legal permission rules in criminal law and competition law, and distinguishes throughout between doctrine it represents, normative premises it adopts, and results that follow from them. In criminal law, the received Japanese account on which an unlawful attacker’s interest forfeits protection is represented as a discount, bounded by the ratio of anticipated harms, on the harm borne by the source of a threat. Conditional on that representation, any incompleteness of the forfeiture reintroduces a balancing term of the same order; the three emergency justifications are distinguished by who bears the harm; and a defender’s prior provocation is separated from the attacker’s wrongfulness. In competition law, the paper models incentives to deliver benefits promised in green cooperation and derives a benchmark-specific threshold for cartel unsustainability. Both fields’ deterrence assessments share an untested assumption about substitution.

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Publication Details

Journal
Asian Journal of Law and Economics
Published
2026-11-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1515/ajle-2026-0068
Primary Topic
Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Justification and Integrated Illegality: An Economic Framework for Criminal Law and Competition Law

Koki Arai
Asian Journal of Law and Economics
Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
article

Justification and Integrated Illegality: An Economic Framework for Criminal Law and Competition Law

Koki Arai
article en

Abstract

Abstract This paper builds a common welfare architecture for legal permission rules in criminal law and competition law, and distinguishes throughout between doctrine it represents, normative premises it adopts, and results that follow from them. In criminal law, the received Japanese account on which an unlawful attacker’s interest forfeits protection is represented as a discount, bounded by the ratio of anticipated harms, on the harm borne by the source of a threat. Conditional on that representation, any incompleteness of the forfeiture reintroduces a balancing term of the same order; the three emergency justifications are distinguished by who bears the harm; and a defender’s prior provocation is separated from the attacker’s wrongfulness. In competition law, the paper models incentives to deliver benefits promised in green cooperation and derives a benchmark-specific threshold for cartel unsustainability. Both fields’ deterrence assessments share an untested assumption about substitution.

Asian Journal of Law and Economics
Kyoritsu Women's University (JP)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
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