Media Trading with Censored Auction Prices: A Stochastic Control and Reinforcement Learning Approach

In real-time bidding, marketing agencies must balance campaign performance, transaction margins and the use of a finite advertising budget. A key difficulty is that market-clearing prices are typically observed only when bids are successful, so the information available for subsequent decisions depends on the bidding policy. We formulate this problem using a continuous-time stochastic control model with a latent price process. To construct a price signal, we consider parallel exploratory subcampaigns in which bids are randomized subject to an upper bound. Under a stylized cross-sectional sampling model, the resulting price estimator is consistent and satisfies a mean-square error bound of order $N^{-1}$, where $N$ is the number of exploratory observations. We then describe a model-based approach combining forward-equation calibration with Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman policy iteration and a physics-informed neural network, alongside an entropy-regularized actor-critic approach based on observable information in a model-free setting. Synthetic experiments illustrate the estimator and the computational procedures. The framework clarifies the decision and information trade-offs faced by the agency, while distinguishing full-information benchmarks and estimated-price policies from the genuinely partially observed control problem.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-12
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.16992
Primary Topic
Adaptive Dynamic Programming Control
Type
preprint
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preprint

Media Trading with Censored Auction Prices: A Stochastic Control and Reinforcement Learning Approach

Huyên Pham, Yun-Ithry Gamrani
arXiv (Cornell University)
Adaptive Dynamic Programming Control
preprint

Media Trading with Censored Auction Prices: A Stochastic Control and Reinforcement Learning Approach

Huyên Pham, Yun-Ithry Gamrani
preprint en

Abstract

In real-time bidding, marketing agencies must balance campaign performance, transaction margins and the use of a finite advertising budget. A key difficulty is that market-clearing prices are typically observed only when bids are successful, so the information available for subsequent decisions depends on the bidding policy. We formulate this problem using a continuous-time stochastic control model with a latent price process. To construct a price signal, we consider parallel exploratory subcampaigns in which bids are randomized subject to an upper bound. Under a stylized cross-sectional sampling model, the resulting price estimator is consistent and satisfies a mean-square error bound of order $N^{-1}$, where $N$ is the number of exploratory observations. We then describe a model-based approach combining forward-equation calibration with Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman policy iteration and a physics-informed neural network, alongside an entropy-regularized actor-critic approach based on observable information in a model-free setting. Synthetic experiments illustrate the estimator and the computational procedures. The framework clarifies the decision and information trade-offs faced by the agency, while distinguishing full-information benchmarks and estimated-price policies from the genuinely partially observed control problem.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Adaptive Dynamic Programming Control
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