NonSense: On the (In)security of FPGA Anti-tamper Sensors
FPGAs are widely used in mission-critical systems, where a successful physical attack can have serious consequences. This makes resilience to such attacks a critical security requirement. To defend against active physical attacks, such as glitching attacks, modern FPGAs rely on on-chip sensors that detect these disturbances and trigger responses, such as key zeroization, before a device is compromised. These sensors are deployed as both hard-IP blocks and soft-IP cores, and their trustworthiness is often taken for granted. In this work, we challenge that assumption and argue that the sensors themselves are a fragile and underexplored attack surface. Drawing on recent results, we show that both the detection and response mechanisms of state-of-the-art sensors can be bypassed without invasive tampering. We further argue that sensor reliability is reduced by factors rarely captured in threat models, including the spatial and frequency-dependent behavior of the system's power delivery network, which can steer a fault to a target while sparing nearby sensors; environmental conditions such as temperature, which shift detection thresholds; and long-term aging, which drifts sensor calibration and may open silent detection gaps. Finally, we propose a set of countermeasures that harden detection and response mechanisms against these effects.
Authors
- Shahin Tajik (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3752-2358)
- Maryam Saadat Safa (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8231-1328)
- Fatemeh Khojasteh Dana (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0002-2759-8615)
- Mehmet Ali Cetin
- Saleh Khalaj Monfared
- Nima Seyed Aghazadeh
Publication Details
- Journal
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Published
- 2026-11-12
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.17065
- Primary Topic
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Type
- preprint