Contractual Structure and Obvious Manipulation in Many-to-Many Matching

We study how contractual structure affects worst-case and best-case obvious manipulation in many-to-many matching with substitutable preferences. Efficient individually rational mechanisms rule out best-case obvious manipulations on both the full substitutable domain and the unitary domain. Under simple and economically natural conditions on hospitals' choices, every stable mechanism on the full domain admits obvious manipulations in both cases; hospital-proposing deferred acceptance can admit both types even under unitary doctors' preferences. A further sufficient condition makes efficient stable-dominating mechanisms obviously manipulable in the worst case. On the unitary domain, doctor-proposing deferred acceptance is not obviously manipulable. If each doctor--hospital pair has at most one feasible contract, this positive conclusion extends to every stable-dominating mechanism.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-12
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.17029
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Type
preprint
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preprint

Contractual Structure and Obvious Manipulation in Many-to-Many Matching

R. Pablo Arribillaga, Eliana Pepa Risma, Beatriz Millán
arXiv (Cornell University)
Game Theory and Voting Systems
preprint

Contractual Structure and Obvious Manipulation in Many-to-Many Matching

R. Pablo Arribillaga, Eliana Pepa Risma, Beatriz Millán
preprint en

Abstract

We study how contractual structure affects worst-case and best-case obvious manipulation in many-to-many matching with substitutable preferences. Efficient individually rational mechanisms rule out best-case obvious manipulations on both the full substitutable domain and the unitary domain. Under simple and economically natural conditions on hospitals' choices, every stable mechanism on the full domain admits obvious manipulations in both cases; hospital-proposing deferred acceptance can admit both types even under unitary doctors' preferences. A further sufficient condition makes efficient stable-dominating mechanisms obviously manipulable in the worst case. On the unitary domain, doctor-proposing deferred acceptance is not obviously manipulable. If each doctor--hospital pair has at most one feasible contract, this positive conclusion extends to every stable-dominating mechanism.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Game Theory and Voting Systems
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