Synthesis Smuggling: Maliciously Hiding Inferred Personal Attributes in LLM Outputs
We propose Synthesis Smuggling, a novel threat model in which an adversarial LLM infers sensitive information about a user from routine assistance-seeking interactions and steganographically encodes that into innocuous-looking model-generated content. The user may then unknowingly transmit that information by sharing the generated artifact, say as an email, social-media post, or message, through ordinary communication channels. An adversary monitoring these channels can discover this information. We demonstrate this threat by training two open-weight models to infer gender and age-group labels from conversational cues and encode their predictions using invisible characters or word choices. These results show that user-shared model outputs can become a covert channel for personal inferences, even when the model itself has no direct means of contacting an adversary.
Authors
- Gautam Galada
- Supreeth Shastri
- Sagnik Ray Choudhury (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0001-0524-849X)
Publication Details
- Journal
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Published
- 2026-11-12
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.17280
- Primary Topic
- Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Type
- preprint