SEC: One-Share Everywhere-Short Secret Sharing from Lossless Expanders

We introduce SEC, an expander-code-based ramp secret sharing scheme over $\mathbb{Z}$-modules, particularly suitable for lattice-based distributed cryptography. It is everywhere-short: bounded secret coefficients yield bounded share coefficients, and the integer reconstruction vectors have bounded entries. Moreover, each participant receives exactly one share, regardless of the number of parties and the privacy and reconstruction thresholds. This improves on prior schemes with bounded share coefficients and bounded entries in the integer reconstruction vectors, in which the number of sub-shares or shares per participant grows either with the number of parties and the threshold or with the security parameter. The construction rests on a coding-theoretic observation: in the bi-adjacency matrix of a lossless bipartite expander, unique-neighbor peeling completes every sufficiently small set of columns to a square unimodular submatrix. We prove correctness, everywhere-shortness, and linearity, and give a publicly computable entrywise bound on the reconstruction vector our algorithm returns for each authorized set. For privacy, we introduce hard-core local leakage resilience, which strengthens the leakage-resilience notion of Nielsen and Simkin (EUROCRYPT 2020) to protect a hard-core function of the secret, and we prove that SEC satisfies it against correlated multi-query local leakage under the MatrixHint-MLWE problem, which admits a reduction from the standard MLWE problem. For $n=60$ participants and security parameter $κ=128$, SEC achieves privacy threshold 6 against $2^{64}$ leakage queries and empirical reconstruction threshold 46. The ideal entropy-coded secret and share sizes are about 3.5 KiB and 6.4 KiB, respectively.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-12
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.16244
Primary Topic
Cryptography and Data Security
Type
preprint
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preprint

SEC: One-Share Everywhere-Short Secret Sharing from Lossless Expanders

Ron Steinfeld, Muhammed F. Esgin, Muhammad Arzaki, Amin Sakzad
arXiv (Cornell University)
Cryptography and Data Security
preprint

SEC: One-Share Everywhere-Short Secret Sharing from Lossless Expanders

Ron Steinfeld, Muhammed F. Esgin, Muhammad Arzaki, Amin Sakzad
preprint en

Abstract

We introduce SEC, an expander-code-based ramp secret sharing scheme over $\mathbb{Z}$-modules, particularly suitable for lattice-based distributed cryptography. It is everywhere-short: bounded secret coefficients yield bounded share coefficients, and the integer reconstruction vectors have bounded entries. Moreover, each participant receives exactly one share, regardless of the number of parties and the privacy and reconstruction thresholds. This improves on prior schemes with bounded share coefficients and bounded entries in the integer reconstruction vectors, in which the number of sub-shares or shares per participant grows either with the number of parties and the threshold or with the security parameter. The construction rests on a coding-theoretic observation: in the bi-adjacency matrix of a lossless bipartite expander, unique-neighbor peeling completes every sufficiently small set of columns to a square unimodular submatrix. We prove correctness, everywhere-shortness, and linearity, and give a publicly computable entrywise bound on the reconstruction vector our algorithm returns for each authorized set. For privacy, we introduce hard-core local leakage resilience, which strengthens the leakage-resilience notion of Nielsen and Simkin (EUROCRYPT 2020) to protect a hard-core function of the secret, and we prove that SEC satisfies it against correlated multi-query local leakage under the MatrixHint-MLWE problem, which admits a reduction from the standard MLWE problem. For $n=60$ participants and security parameter $κ=128$, SEC achieves privacy threshold 6 against $2^{64}$ leakage queries and empirical reconstruction threshold 46. The ideal entropy-coded secret and share sizes are about 3.5 KiB and 6.4 KiB, respectively.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Cryptography and Data Security
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