Accuracy Is Not Welfare: Evaluating AI Buyers under Strategic Price Complexity in a Synthetic Duopoly
AI buying agents may alter sellers' incentives as well as consumers' decisions. In a synthetic duopoly, we evaluate price-comparison pipelines on a fixed menu and in empirical correlated-equilibrium games. Calculator assistance selects an optimal offer 84.00% of the time, versus 68.57% under verified-total disclosure, yet disclosure has a 20.14-unit higher consumer-worst equilibrium surplus. A frozen-strategy holdout comparison favors disclosure, while re-solving equilibria under scenario resampling produces a range spanning zero. These model-based results show why accuracy, loss severity, seller incentives, and welfare incidence require separate measurement.
Authors
- Ning Jiaqu
Publication Details
- Journal
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Published
- 2026-11-12
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.16471
- Primary Topic
- Auction Theory and Applications
- Type
- preprint