Voting for no one. Subnational politics and invalid votes in Argentine presidential elections

Abstract How do intergovernmental fiscal institutions shape the cost-benefit calculus of political participation? This paper shows that fiscal correspondence is a systematic determinant of deliberate invalid voting in Argentine presidential elections through a rational ignorance mechanism. Under compulsory voting, the extensive margin of participation is effectively closed by law; the operative margin is intensive. In provinces whose budgets are dominated by automatic transfers, the transmission chain from the presidential ballot to observable fiscal outcomes runs through a long, administratively opaque chain that rational voters do not invest in decoding given the near-zero expected private return on a single ballot. This fiscal opacity compresses the partisan differential attached to the presidential election, making deliberate valid voting individually irrational for a share of the electorate and generating blank ballot compliance under compulsion. Using a balanced panel of 23 Argentine provinces across nine presidential elections (1989–2023), I find that higher fiscal correspondence is associated with significantly fewer blank and invalid ballots. The effect is concentrated on blank ballots rather than null ballots, confirming that the mechanism operates on the deliberate disengagement margin through rational ignorance rather than through accidental ballot errors. Results are robust to instrumental variable estimation, exclusion of oil-producing provinces, and structural break tests around the 2001 crisis. The findings indicate that transfer dependency is not only a source of fiscal inefficiency and political distortion but also an independent institutional generator of rational ignorance at the intensive margin of democratic participation. JEL codes: D72, P16, H11, H77

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Publication Details

Journal
Research Square
Published
2026-11-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11494472/v1
Primary Topic
Electoral Systems and Political Participation
Type
preprint

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preprint

Voting for no one. Subnational politics and invalid votes in Argentine presidential elections

Osvaldo Meloni
Research Square
Electoral Systems and Political Participation
preprint

Voting for no one. Subnational politics and invalid votes in Argentine presidential elections

Osvaldo Meloni
preprint en

Abstract

Abstract How do intergovernmental fiscal institutions shape the cost-benefit calculus of political participation? This paper shows that fiscal correspondence is a systematic determinant of deliberate invalid voting in Argentine presidential elections through a rational ignorance mechanism. Under compulsory voting, the extensive margin of participation is effectively closed by law; the operative margin is intensive. In provinces whose budgets are dominated by automatic transfers, the transmission chain from the presidential ballot to observable fiscal outcomes runs through a long, administratively opaque chain that rational voters do not invest in decoding given the near-zero expected private return on a single ballot. This fiscal opacity compresses the partisan differential attached to the presidential election, making deliberate valid voting individually irrational for a share of the electorate and generating blank ballot compliance under compulsion. Using a balanced panel of 23 Argentine provinces across nine presidential elections (1989–2023), I find that higher fiscal correspondence is associated with significantly fewer blank and invalid ballots. The effect is concentrated on blank ballots rather than null ballots, confirming that the mechanism operates on the deliberate disengagement margin through rational ignorance rather than through accidental ballot errors. Results are robust to instrumental variable estimation, exclusion of oil-producing provinces, and structural break tests around the 2001 crisis. The findings indicate that transfer dependency is not only a source of fiscal inefficiency and political distortion but also an independent institutional generator of rational ignorance at the intensive margin of democratic participation. JEL codes: D72, P16, H11, H77

Research Square
National University of Tucumán (AR)
Universidad Nacional de Tucumán
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Electoral Systems and Political Participation
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