Strategic AI Investment and Sales Mode Selection in Platform Supply Chains with Consumer Privacy Concerns

We construct a game-theoretic model consisting of a single manufacturer and a single platform to examine how the choices made by AI investors regarding implementation and sales models affect supply chain operations in a scenario where artificial intelligence raises consumer privacy concerns. We consider three scenarios in two selling modes: no AI investment, manufacturer-led AI investment, and platform-led AI investment. Game models under different scenarios are established and solved. The results show that: (1) Consumer privacy disutility reduces AI investment in all four investment scenarios. Platform ancillary data revenue strengthens investment incentives under wholesale selling and platform-led agency selling but does not enter the manufacturer’s investment objective under manufacturer-led agency selling. (2) Within the wholesale mode, manufacturer-led investment generates higher firm profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare than platform-led investment. Under agency selling, the preferred investor depends on ancillary data revenue and the stakeholder considered. (3) Under the baseline profit-sharing contract, agency selling yields higher consumer surplus and social welfare without AI investment and with platform-led investment. With manufacturer-led investment, wholesale selling can yield higher welfare over a feasible low-cost interval whose existence depends on residual market potential. A revenue-sharing extension preserves the agency-mode welfare advantage under the selected payoff-matched commissions in both numerical settings, while commission sensitivity reveals regions of wholesale dominance. Further extensions examine AI operating costs, investment cost sharing, and AI-dependent price sensitivity. The results show how investment incentives, contractual payments, and privacy disutility jointly determine supply chain outcomes.

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Publication Details

Journal
Systems
Published
2026-11-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/systems14111457
Primary Topic
Supply Chain and Inventory Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Strategic AI Investment and Sales Mode Selection in Platform Supply Chains with Consumer Privacy Concerns

Lin Chen, Huijie Li, Yinhua Jiang, Yang Zhou et al.
5 links
Systems
Supply Chain and Inventory Management
article

Strategic AI Investment and Sales Mode Selection in Platform Supply Chains with Consumer Privacy Concerns

Lin Chen, Huijie Li, Yinhua Jiang, Yang Zhou, Ran Tao
article en

Abstract

We construct a game-theoretic model consisting of a single manufacturer and a single platform to examine how the choices made by AI investors regarding implementation and sales models affect supply chain operations in a scenario where artificial intelligence raises consumer privacy concerns. We consider three scenarios in two selling modes: no AI investment, manufacturer-led AI investment, and platform-led AI investment. Game models under different scenarios are established and solved. The results show that: (1) Consumer privacy disutility reduces AI investment in all four investment scenarios. Platform ancillary data revenue strengthens investment incentives under wholesale selling and platform-led agency selling but does not enter the manufacturer’s investment objective under manufacturer-led agency selling. (2) Within the wholesale mode, manufacturer-led investment generates higher firm profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare than platform-led investment. Under agency selling, the preferred investor depends on ancillary data revenue and the stakeholder considered. (3) Under the baseline profit-sharing contract, agency selling yields higher consumer surplus and social welfare without AI investment and with platform-led investment. With manufacturer-led investment, wholesale selling can yield higher welfare over a feasible low-cost interval whose existence depends on residual market potential. A revenue-sharing extension preserves the agency-mode welfare advantage under the selected payoff-matched commissions in both numerical settings, while commission sensitivity reveals regions of wholesale dominance. Further extensions examine AI operating costs, investment cost sharing, and AI-dependent price sensitivity. The results show how investment incentives, contractual payments, and privacy disutility jointly determine supply chain outcomes.

SystemsVol. 14(11)
Wuhan Institute of Technology (CN)
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Supply Chain and Inventory Management
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