Core nonemptiness for $2/3$-convex games
We study the core of $2/3$-convex games, a class of transferable-utility (TU) games that generalizes convex games, which requires at least two of any three distinct coalitions satisfy the supermodular inequality. We show that every $2/3$-convex game admits a marginal worth vector in the core, and hence has a nonempty core. Our proof is constructive and yields a linear-time algorithm for finding such a core allocation. We also show that $2/3$-convexity does not imply permutational convexity in general, while the implication holds under an additional superadditivity condition on pairs of singletons. As an application, we introduce a TU model motivated by the OSCE's consensus-minus-two procedure and show that the resulting game is $2/3$-convex but need not be convex.
Authors
- Kenzo Imamura (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7200-1374)
- Keisuke Bando (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7973-1142)
- Ryuhei Mizutani (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2944-9066)
- Toshiyuki Hirai
Publication Details
- Journal
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Published
- 2026-11-12
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.16207
- Primary Topic
- Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Type
- preprint