From Wealth to Welfare: How Economic Elites Made Inequality Work

Why do advanced economies engage in substantial income transfers but scarcely redistribute wealth? This paper argues that wealth inequality historically led economic elites to expand income transfers to propertyless households to stabilize the unequal property order. I study this proposition in the context of landholding inequality in Prussia. Estate owners, I argue, used income transfers to offset the economic insecurities of landless workers who could not rely on landownership as insurance against income loss. I digitize surveys of local poor relief and exploit Prussia’s administrative structure, where estates functioned as independent local authorities. The results show that landholding inequality caused higher income transfers to the poor, driven by the redistributive actions of estate owners. Estate owners allocated relief as social protection over the life cycle for households outside of the active workforce. This commitment to insurance was associated with greater voter support for the conservative parties representing estate owners’ interests.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Comparative Political Studies
Published
2026-11-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140261500270
Primary Topic
Social Policy and Reform Studies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

Funders

Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
article

From Wealth to Welfare: How Economic Elites Made Inequality Work

Nils Blossey
4 links
Comparative Political Studies
Social Policy and Reform Studies
article

From Wealth to Welfare: How Economic Elites Made Inequality Work

Nils Blossey
article en

Abstract

Why do advanced economies engage in substantial income transfers but scarcely redistribute wealth? This paper argues that wealth inequality historically led economic elites to expand income transfers to propertyless households to stabilize the unequal property order. I study this proposition in the context of landholding inequality in Prussia. Estate owners, I argue, used income transfers to offset the economic insecurities of landless workers who could not rely on landownership as insurance against income loss. I digitize surveys of local poor relief and exploit Prussia’s administrative structure, where estates functioned as independent local authorities. The results show that landholding inequality caused higher income transfers to the poor, driven by the redistributive actions of estate owners. Estate owners allocated relief as social protection over the life cycle for households outside of the active workforce. This commitment to insurance was associated with greater voter support for the conservative parties representing estate owners’ interests.

Comparative Political Studies
University of Cologne (DE)
Universität zu Köln
Reduced inequalities, No poverty
Social Policy and Reform Studies
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Laika access coming soon