Between Regime Security and State Security: Elite Survival Strategies and the Erosion of Institutional Order in Ethiopia

Abstract This paper argues that Ethiopia's state has become fragile since 2018, and that its political instability stems from confusion between regime and state security. Amid internal political fragmentation, multiple armed groups loyal to regions rather than the centre, and ethnic division, leaders have consistently chosen to ensure their own survival before everything else. Drawing on examples of Third World insecurity paradoxes, coup-proofing, personal rule, and authoritarian legalism, this paper discusses three mechanisms driving institutional turmoil. First, restructuring the security apparatus has led to an overstretched security apparatus that, although politically loyal, can easily be challenged along ethnic lines. Second, the state increasingly uses legal and electoral institutions to manage and keep power in check through courts, election commissions, states of emergency, and media control. Third, the central government has turned federalism into a security tool by arming or disarming regional armed forces when necessary.

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Publication Details

Journal
Research Square
Published
2026-11-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11477347/v1
Primary Topic
Political Conflict and Governance
Type
preprint
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Between Regime Security and State Security: Elite Survival Strategies and the Erosion of Institutional Order in Ethiopia

Daniel W. Abate, Chekol
1 links
Research Square
Political Conflict and Governance
preprint

Between Regime Security and State Security: Elite Survival Strategies and the Erosion of Institutional Order in Ethiopia

Daniel W. Abate, Chekol
preprint en

Abstract

Abstract This paper argues that Ethiopia's state has become fragile since 2018, and that its political instability stems from confusion between regime and state security. Amid internal political fragmentation, multiple armed groups loyal to regions rather than the centre, and ethnic division, leaders have consistently chosen to ensure their own survival before everything else. Drawing on examples of Third World insecurity paradoxes, coup-proofing, personal rule, and authoritarian legalism, this paper discusses three mechanisms driving institutional turmoil. First, restructuring the security apparatus has led to an overstretched security apparatus that, although politically loyal, can easily be challenged along ethnic lines. Second, the state increasingly uses legal and electoral institutions to manage and keep power in check through courts, election commissions, states of emergency, and media control. Third, the central government has turned federalism into a security tool by arming or disarming regional armed forces when necessary.

Research Square
Bahir Dar University (ET)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Political Conflict and Governance
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