Strategic disclosure and epistemic manipulation in extensive games

In many strategic settings, agents can influence opponents by selectively disclosing truthful information about their own future actions. We introduce a game-theoretic framework to model this phenomenon. As a case study, we consider a two-player, alternating-move epistemic game in which Player A evaluates actions under a conservative maximin rule, while Player B-the manipulator-leverages this behavior by strategically revealing commitments. We prove that the manipulator can implement every inducible outcome using at most n disclosures in a binary game of depth 2n with n decisions per player. This establishes a sharp contrast between the game tree's exponential size and the linear amount of information required to control the outcome, highlighting a general mechanism by which limited information can exert disproportionate strategic influence.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-12
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.17084
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Applications
Type
preprint
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preprint

Strategic disclosure and epistemic manipulation in extensive games

Benjamin Prud'homme, Sergei Nikolaevich Artemov
arXiv (Cornell University)
Game Theory and Applications
preprint

Strategic disclosure and epistemic manipulation in extensive games

Benjamin Prud'homme, Sergei Nikolaevich Artemov
preprint en

Abstract

In many strategic settings, agents can influence opponents by selectively disclosing truthful information about their own future actions. We introduce a game-theoretic framework to model this phenomenon. As a case study, we consider a two-player, alternating-move epistemic game in which Player A evaluates actions under a conservative maximin rule, while Player B-the manipulator-leverages this behavior by strategically revealing commitments. We prove that the manipulator can implement every inducible outcome using at most n disclosures in a binary game of depth 2n with n decisions per player. This establishes a sharp contrast between the game tree's exponential size and the linear amount of information required to control the outcome, highlighting a general mechanism by which limited information can exert disproportionate strategic influence.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Game Theory and Applications
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