Silent Drift: Detecting Stealthy False-Data-Injection Attacks on Power-Grid Stability Signals
False-data-injection (FDI) detectors for power grids are usually demonstrated against attacks large enough to trip a state estimator. The attacks that matter operationally are the opposite kind: small, slow, and sized to stay inside the noise. We ask a simpler and, we argue, more useful question than "does the detector work": how large must an injection be before each detector can see it at all? Using the UCI Electrical Grid Stability Simulated Data (10,000 operating points of a four-node decentralised-control grid), we corrupt the reported features of a single grid participant with scale, shift, and slow-ramp (drift) injections at magnitudes from 1% to 50%, and we measure detection rate against attack magnitude for four detectors fitted on clean data only: a supervised stability classifier (symptom: prediction flips), an Isolation Forest, a physics-residual detector that predicts the participant's reports from the other nodes and scores the Mahalanobis residual, and an EWMA process-control chart on that residual stream. Because the simulated data obeys an exact power-balance identity, the residual detector is trivially perfect on the as-recorded data; we therefore report a second, headline condition in which every feature carries sensor noise of 1% of its standard deviation and all thresholds are recalibrated at the same nominal 5% false-positive rate. Under sensor noise, the detection boundaries separate sharply. The physics-residual detector reaches 88% detection for a 1% scale injection and 94% for a 5% shift injection; the EWMA chart accumulates evidence and reaches a 96% alarm rate for a 2% shift injection that the per-row residual detector catches only 30% of the time, and it alarms 14 samples into a drift attack whose instantaneous magnitude is still below 0.4%. The Isolation Forest never exceeds 38% detection even at a 50% injection, and the stability classifier flips at most 11% of its predictions at 50% — a 50% corruption of one participant's reports costs it only about 6.5 accuracy points. Generic, physics-blind monitoring of this stream is, in a quantifiable sense, silent; a one-line physical invariant is not, but only down to the noise floor that carries it.
Authors
- Saagar Sengupta
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-13
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24208939
- Primary Topic
- Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Type
- preprint