Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean as a Philosophical Forerunner of Neutrosophic Logic
The present article examines whether, and to what extent, Aristotle's doctrine of the mean in the Nicomachean Ethics anticipates, at the level of philosophical intuition, the neutrosophic notion of a third, qualitatively distinct state between an idea and its opposite (Neut-A), one that cannot be reduced to a mere combination of the two extremes. It is argued that while the Aristotelian mean constitutes neither a mathematical nor a logical precursor of the neutrosophic calculus (the functions of truth, indeterminacy and falsity T, I, F), it shares a structural and conceptual affinity with the philosophical intuition of neutrosophy: in both cases, the intermediate state is not a passive linear interpolation between two extremes, but is actively and contextually determined by a specific act of judgment, and constitutes a genuinely distinct third category beyond the binary opposition.
Authors
- Spyros Missiakoulis (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5174-6481)
Institutions
- Philips University (CY)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-13
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24191169
- Primary Topic
- Smarandache Functions and Recreational Number Theory
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00