Constituent Authority and Recursive Preference Inclusion: A Theory of Collective Self-Government and Heteronomy

The rules of collective choice distribute more than decision-making opportunities: they allocate authority over the revision of those rules. This article develops a theory of recursive preference inclusion to explain when the location of final constituent authority affects the long-run accommodation of members’ preferences in binding decisions. Political autonomy consists in a collectivity’s effective, non-overridable power to determine and revise its ends and decision-generating procedures; realized inclusion is measured independently at the level of successive outcomes. The model distinguishes delegated gatekeeping, final override, and amendment of the revision procedure itself. It derives state-contingent rates of corrective and damaging rule changes from authorization decisions and embeds them in a four-state process where failures of inclusion can also prompt constitutional amendment proposals. An exact stationary solution and comparative conditions show when constituent control improves inclusion and when its advantages are offset by informational error, institutional friction, or harmful revisions. The theory identifies an observable causal pathway from final authority through selective institutional revision to longitudinal inclusion.

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Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24188731
Primary Topic
Political Theory and Democracy
Type
preprint
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preprint

Constituent Authority and Recursive Preference Inclusion: A Theory of Collective Self-Government and Heteronomy

Anytos Angelis
3 links
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Political Theory and Democracy
preprint

Constituent Authority and Recursive Preference Inclusion: A Theory of Collective Self-Government and Heteronomy

Anytos Angelis
preprint en

Abstract

The rules of collective choice distribute more than decision-making opportunities: they allocate authority over the revision of those rules. This article develops a theory of recursive preference inclusion to explain when the location of final constituent authority affects the long-run accommodation of members’ preferences in binding decisions. Political autonomy consists in a collectivity’s effective, non-overridable power to determine and revise its ends and decision-generating procedures; realized inclusion is measured independently at the level of successive outcomes. The model distinguishes delegated gatekeeping, final override, and amendment of the revision procedure itself. It derives state-contingent rates of corrective and damaging rule changes from authorization decisions and embeds them in a four-state process where failures of inclusion can also prompt constitutional amendment proposals. An exact stationary solution and comparative conditions show when constituent control improves inclusion and when its advantages are offset by informational error, institutional friction, or harmful revisions. The theory identifies an observable causal pathway from final authority through selective institutional revision to longitudinal inclusion.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Political Theory and Democracy
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