The Unseen Threat: How Complementary Combinations of Acoustic Features Compromise Speech Privacy

The interaction of acoustic features in leaking private information remains underexplored. This work focuses on time-domain features, i.e., broadband RMS level and pitch, alone and combined with temporally smoothed and subsampled Mel spectrograms. Privacy is assessed using informed automatic speech recognition and speaker-verification attacks, while utility for conversational analysis is evaluated using voice activity detection and speaker diarisation. RMS level and pitch alone exposed limited information, but fusion with 500 ms-smoothed Mel spectrograms enhanced utility while substantially increasing speech-content leakage. Specifically, the combination with RMS level showed that fine-grained temporal dynamics can amplify leakage from coarsely sampled spectral features. Speaker-identity protection remained limited for all tested features. Overall, these findings indicate that privacy assessments performed on individual acoustic features may underestimate leakage after feature fusion.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-12
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.16637
Primary Topic
Speech Recognition and Synthesis
Type
preprint
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preprint

The Unseen Threat: How Complementary Combinations of Acoustic Features Compromise Speech Privacy

Jule Pohlhausen, Jörg Bitzer
arXiv (Cornell University)
Speech Recognition and Synthesis
preprint

The Unseen Threat: How Complementary Combinations of Acoustic Features Compromise Speech Privacy

Jule Pohlhausen, Jörg Bitzer
preprint en

Abstract

The interaction of acoustic features in leaking private information remains underexplored. This work focuses on time-domain features, i.e., broadband RMS level and pitch, alone and combined with temporally smoothed and subsampled Mel spectrograms. Privacy is assessed using informed automatic speech recognition and speaker-verification attacks, while utility for conversational analysis is evaluated using voice activity detection and speaker diarisation. RMS level and pitch alone exposed limited information, but fusion with 500 ms-smoothed Mel spectrograms enhanced utility while substantially increasing speech-content leakage. Specifically, the combination with RMS level showed that fine-grained temporal dynamics can amplify leakage from coarsely sampled spectral features. Speaker-identity protection remained limited for all tested features. Overall, these findings indicate that privacy assessments performed on individual acoustic features may underestimate leakage after feature fusion.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Speech Recognition and Synthesis
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