Fictitious Play When Agents Are Not Expected-Utility Maximizers: A Geometric Analysis in $2$-Action Games

Fictitious play (FP) is one of the earliest and most fundamental learning procedures in games, where each agent independently chooses a best response to the empirical distribution of opponents' past actions by maximizing the expected payoff with respect to it. However, learning agents may not always be expected-utility maximizers: they may use nonlinear evaluation functionals to account for the uncertainty induced by the opponents, e.g., via risk measures. In this work, we study nonlinear fictitious play (NL-FP), in which each pure action is evaluated by a general, possibly nonlinear functional of the payoff distribution induced by the opponent's empirical belief. To analyze NL-FP, we first identify a single-crossing property (SCP) of evaluation functionals that preserves the classical geometry of FP in $2\times2$ games. Furthermore, we conduct a novel geometric analysis of the convergence behavior of NL-FP in $2\times2$ games, even when the SCP fails. Beyond $2\times2$ games, we show that the convergence of NL-FP in $2\times n$ ($n\ge3$) games may fail even for continuous-time NL-FP, when the two-action player uses conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) in a $2\times3$ game. In addition, we identify a finite-crossing condition that ensures convergence of the selected continuous-time dynamics and the discrete-time iterates in general $2\times n$ games, which also provides new insights into the global landscape of continuous-time classical FP in such games.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-12
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.17286
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Applications
Type
preprint
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preprint

Fictitious Play When Agents Are Not Expected-Utility Maximizers: A Geometric Analysis in $2$-Action Games

Solaleh Mohammadi, Kaiqing Zhang, Hao Liang
arXiv (Cornell University)
Game Theory and Applications
preprint

Fictitious Play When Agents Are Not Expected-Utility Maximizers: A Geometric Analysis in $2$-Action Games

Solaleh Mohammadi, Kaiqing Zhang, Hao Liang
preprint en

Abstract

Fictitious play (FP) is one of the earliest and most fundamental learning procedures in games, where each agent independently chooses a best response to the empirical distribution of opponents' past actions by maximizing the expected payoff with respect to it. However, learning agents may not always be expected-utility maximizers: they may use nonlinear evaluation functionals to account for the uncertainty induced by the opponents, e.g., via risk measures. In this work, we study nonlinear fictitious play (NL-FP), in which each pure action is evaluated by a general, possibly nonlinear functional of the payoff distribution induced by the opponent's empirical belief. To analyze NL-FP, we first identify a single-crossing property (SCP) of evaluation functionals that preserves the classical geometry of FP in $2\times2$ games. Furthermore, we conduct a novel geometric analysis of the convergence behavior of NL-FP in $2\times2$ games, even when the SCP fails. Beyond $2\times2$ games, we show that the convergence of NL-FP in $2\times n$ ($n\ge3$) games may fail even for continuous-time NL-FP, when the two-action player uses conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) in a $2\times3$ game. In addition, we identify a finite-crossing condition that ensures convergence of the selected continuous-time dynamics and the discrete-time iterates in general $2\times n$ games, which also provides new insights into the global landscape of continuous-time classical FP in such games.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Game Theory and Applications
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