Shake, But Do Not Mix: International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

This article examines the distinctive legal nature of mixed (hybrid) tribunals and the implications of their institutional design for international cooperation and judicial assistance. The study concludes that the agreements signed with the United Nations establishing these judicial bodies impose obligations of cooperation only upon the States parties to the relevant agreements and do not give rise to a corresponding general obligation on the third States. The examples of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon demonstrate that the absence of a binding obligation requiring third States to cooperate with mixed (hybrid) tribunals may materially constrain the effectiveness of their judicial activities. At the same time, political support from the United Nations Security Council may, under certain circumstances, mitigate, at least in part, the structural weaknesses of the applicable regime of international cooperation and judicial assistance.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
International criminal law and international justice
Published
2026-11-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.18572/2071-1190-2026-4-31-34
Primary Topic
International Law and Human Rights
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Shake, But Do Not Mix: International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

Nikita E. Kolmakov
International criminal law and international justice
International Law and Human Rights
article

Shake, But Do Not Mix: International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

Nikita E. Kolmakov
article en

Abstract

This article examines the distinctive legal nature of mixed (hybrid) tribunals and the implications of their institutional design for international cooperation and judicial assistance. The study concludes that the agreements signed with the United Nations establishing these judicial bodies impose obligations of cooperation only upon the States parties to the relevant agreements and do not give rise to a corresponding general obligation on the third States. The examples of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon demonstrate that the absence of a binding obligation requiring third States to cooperate with mixed (hybrid) tribunals may materially constrain the effectiveness of their judicial activities. At the same time, political support from the United Nations Security Council may, under certain circumstances, mitigate, at least in part, the structural weaknesses of the applicable regime of international cooperation and judicial assistance.

International criminal law and international justice
Peace, justice, and strong institutions, Partnerships for the goals
International Law and Human Rights
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