Can Machines Be Punished? Punitive Projection and Artificial Sanction
Abstract Can artificial agents be morally punished without experiencing suffering? Beginning with a hypothetical Cybercab that fatally strikes a pedestrian and is subsequently dismantled, this paper examines whether technological destruction constitutes punishment and whether such an intervention adequately addresses the victim's family's claims. Through conceptual analysis and moral and epistemic normative analysis, I defend a conditional account of artificial punishability grounded in normative addressability , comprising four conditions: normative competence, attributable control, diachronic answerability, and sanctionability. Where these conditions are satisfied and culpable wrongdoing is established, status-responsive punishment may consist in an authoritative, retrospective, proportionate, and censure-linked deprivation of an artificial agent's own normative authority. Such deprivation may constitute a role-relative ontological loss without requiring phenomenal suffering or the elimination of computational capacities. I introduce punitive projection to challenge the treatment of imagined offender suffering as a measure of punitive adequacy, and punitive theatre to distinguish symbolic interventions from justified punishment. The resulting principle of normative punitive parity holds that artificial origin and the absence of suffering do not independently exclude punitive liability, without implying equal moral status or identical sanctions. I further develop the Distributed Accountability Constraint to establish that artificial punishment cannot displace the independent responsibilities of developers, operators, and institutions. Through consequential recognition , I distinguish justified punishment from the broader obligations of attribution, repair, and prevention owed to victims. The argument does not presume that existing artificial systems possess moral agency; rather, it establishes the conditions under which punishment without suffering may be morally justified while acknowledging the unresolved objection concerning adversity without welfare interests.
Authors
- Gehad Abdelal (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6175-2896)
Institutions
- University of Georgia (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Research Square
- Published
- 2026-11-13
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11372741/v1
- Primary Topic
- Literary and Philosophical Studies
- Type
- preprint