Testing the Crisis Plus One Theory in the Iranian Case: Institutional-Legal Analysis of Crisis Management Policy (1991–2026)

This article assesses Iran’s crisis-management institutions from 1991 to 2026 through Hamidreza Safari’s Crisis Plus One (C+1) framework. The framework treats a crisis not only as an emergency to be managed, but as a point at which institutions should learn, anticipate future risk, coordinate across agencies, build resilience and enable public participation (S1). A documentary, institutional-legal analysis examines legal texts, policy plans, governmental reporting and secondary institutional sources. The chronology begins with the 1988 edition of Standard 2800 as pre-history and follows three broad institutional phases: the formation and early expansion of national disaster institutions (1991–2007); statutory consolidation and planning (2008–2018); and the 2019 law’s implementation and accountability problem (2019–2026). The principal finding is a persistent evidentiary and institutional gap among four analytically distinct elements: (1) legal mandate, (2) delegated drafting, (3) budget authorization, and (4) verifiable implementation. The existence of a mandate or a drafting deadline does not establish an authorized appropriation, and neither proves execution or outcomes. Article 4 of the 2019 Crisis Management Law required preparation of implementing regulations within six months (S5); the August 2026 Parliamentary Research Center report no. 21772 records inadequate responses and an inactive monitoring system (S6). These records support concern about institutional follow-through, but do not establish that no implementation occurred. Data-quality problems include conflicting dates assigned to a 2005 national report and an unresolved dating discrepancy surrounding the 2026 report. C1I (concentration of power / structural rent dependence) is considered only as a proposed indicator requiring future operational specification. The article concludes that C+1 is useful as a diagnostic lens, while stronger implementation claims require auditable budgets, regulations, administrative records and outcome data. Keywords: Crisis Plus One; Iran; crisis management; disaster risk reduction; institutional learning; implementation; legal institutions.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-12
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24171573
Primary Topic
Disaster Management and Resilience
Type
preprint
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
preprint

Testing the Crisis Plus One Theory in the Iranian Case: Institutional-Legal Analysis of Crisis Management Policy (1991–2026)

hamidreza safari
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Disaster Management and Resilience
preprint

Testing the Crisis Plus One Theory in the Iranian Case: Institutional-Legal Analysis of Crisis Management Policy (1991–2026)

hamidreza safari
preprint en

Abstract

This article assesses Iran’s crisis-management institutions from 1991 to 2026 through Hamidreza Safari’s Crisis Plus One (C+1) framework. The framework treats a crisis not only as an emergency to be managed, but as a point at which institutions should learn, anticipate future risk, coordinate across agencies, build resilience and enable public participation (S1). A documentary, institutional-legal analysis examines legal texts, policy plans, governmental reporting and secondary institutional sources. The chronology begins with the 1988 edition of Standard 2800 as pre-history and follows three broad institutional phases: the formation and early expansion of national disaster institutions (1991–2007); statutory consolidation and planning (2008–2018); and the 2019 law’s implementation and accountability problem (2019–2026). The principal finding is a persistent evidentiary and institutional gap among four analytically distinct elements: (1) legal mandate, (2) delegated drafting, (3) budget authorization, and (4) verifiable implementation. The existence of a mandate or a drafting deadline does not establish an authorized appropriation, and neither proves execution or outcomes. Article 4 of the 2019 Crisis Management Law required preparation of implementing regulations within six months (S5); the August 2026 Parliamentary Research Center report no. 21772 records inadequate responses and an inactive monitoring system (S6). These records support concern about institutional follow-through, but do not establish that no implementation occurred. Data-quality problems include conflicting dates assigned to a 2005 national report and an unresolved dating discrepancy surrounding the 2026 report. C1I (concentration of power / structural rent dependence) is considered only as a proposed indicator requiring future operational specification. The article concludes that C+1 is useful as a diagnostic lens, while stronger implementation claims require auditable budgets, regulations, administrative records and outcome data. Keywords: Crisis Plus One; Iran; crisis management; disaster risk reduction; institutional learning; implementation; legal institutions.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Disaster Management and Resilience
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Laika access coming soon