The 2026 House of Representatives Election Case Study on heain-core Results Anyone Can Check, Ballots No One Can Open Alone 16 Nodes in 3 Tiers, Units as Apps: Paper Ballots through Core (Design A) and Voting Machines with Blind Tokens (Design B) aga

Abstract Thailand's House of Representatives election on 8 February 2026 had 52,933,610 eligible voters in 400 constituencies and about 99,487 polling units [2][14]. Most reported problems lay in aggregation and reporting: the results system stalled at 31%, stopped at 94% and never reached 100% [8][9]; unit results came out as PDFs with units missing [9]; and a report said totals did not match the unit tally forms (S.S. 5/18) [18]. A ballot barcode that could link ballots to voters was ruled not unconstitutional (28 Sep 2026) [12]. The author simulated the election on heain-core with 16 nodes in 3 tiers and 18 polling units as apps, comparing two designs with a model of the system as it was (asis). Design A keeps paper ballots, but each unit signs a digital form 5/18 onto a public log and every aggregate must cite the results beneath it. Design B uses voting machines, keeping register, token-blinding kiosk (RFC 9474 [19]) and machine apart, and seals each ballot at once with core's key. All data are synthetic. On one HP Z840 every round passed. asis could not detect 50 votes added in aggregation, while an observer without a certificate found them in 3.07 seconds. asis showed 100% with one unit missing and stuck nationwide at 33.3% when its reporting point failed; a heain standby took over in 14.7 seconds. A tampered machine passed every electronic check and was caught only by a paper-slip audit. At national scale, 478 nodes received all 99,487 unit forms in 34 seconds. Of five core rounds, C12 lets ballots open only with committee approval plus 3 of 5 outside organizations; C13–C16 fix behavior when a parent is down or a standby takes over. Keywords: HEAIN Framework, heain-core, General Election, Thailand 2026, Election Results Reporting, Public Verifiability, Transparency Log, Blind Signatures, Paper Audit Trail, Threshold Key Custody, Shamir Secret Sharing, Sealed Ballots

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-12
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24170616
Primary Topic
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
Type
preprint
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preprint

The 2026 House of Representatives Election Case Study on heain-core Results Anyone Can Check, Ballots No One Can Open Alone 16 Nodes in 3 Tiers, Units as Apps: Paper Ballots through Core (Design A) and Voting Machines with Blind Tokens (Design B) aga

JAKKRIT BOONMA
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
preprint

The 2026 House of Representatives Election Case Study on heain-core Results Anyone Can Check, Ballots No One Can Open Alone 16 Nodes in 3 Tiers, Units as Apps: Paper Ballots through Core (Design A) and Voting Machines with Blind Tokens (Design B) aga

JAKKRIT BOONMA
preprint en

Abstract

Abstract Thailand's House of Representatives election on 8 February 2026 had 52,933,610 eligible voters in 400 constituencies and about 99,487 polling units [2][14]. Most reported problems lay in aggregation and reporting: the results system stalled at 31%, stopped at 94% and never reached 100% [8][9]; unit results came out as PDFs with units missing [9]; and a report said totals did not match the unit tally forms (S.S. 5/18) [18]. A ballot barcode that could link ballots to voters was ruled not unconstitutional (28 Sep 2026) [12]. The author simulated the election on heain-core with 16 nodes in 3 tiers and 18 polling units as apps, comparing two designs with a model of the system as it was (asis). Design A keeps paper ballots, but each unit signs a digital form 5/18 onto a public log and every aggregate must cite the results beneath it. Design B uses voting machines, keeping register, token-blinding kiosk (RFC 9474 [19]) and machine apart, and seals each ballot at once with core's key. All data are synthetic. On one HP Z840 every round passed. asis could not detect 50 votes added in aggregation, while an observer without a certificate found them in 3.07 seconds. asis showed 100% with one unit missing and stuck nationwide at 33.3% when its reporting point failed; a heain standby took over in 14.7 seconds. A tampered machine passed every electronic check and was caught only by a paper-slip audit. At national scale, 478 nodes received all 99,487 unit forms in 34 seconds. Of five core rounds, C12 lets ballots open only with committee approval plus 3 of 5 outside organizations; C13–C16 fix behavior when a parent is down or a standby takes over. Keywords: HEAIN Framework, heain-core, General Election, Thailand 2026, Election Results Reporting, Public Verifiability, Transparency Log, Blind Signatures, Paper Audit Trail, Threshold Key Custody, Shamir Secret Sharing, Sealed Ballots

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
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