RETHINKING DISTRIBUTED SERVICE PROTECTION: FROM ADD-ON TO CORE DESIGN CONSTRAINT
Security-by-design frameworks report measurable protection when the system boundary they evaluate remains the same object across the validation period, a condition satisfied in centralized and early-stage microservice deployments. Event-driven distributed architectures reconfigure service boundaries and authorization-relevant state continuously during ordinary operation, which changes what a security evaluation captures over that period. The propagation window, the interval between a state transition committing at one service and its dependent authorization constraint becoming visible at another, functions as the mechanism through which continuously operating distributed systems generate exposure exceeding what boundary-stable evaluation methods register. Drawing on the security-by-design, architectural-evolution, and zero-trust literatures alongside a documented technical account of authorization propagation and consistency-oriented transaction architecture in commercial distributed systems, the analysis quantifies the propagation window's duration, compares the throughput and latency of coordinator-based and coordinator-free consistency protocols under matched load conditions, and shows that a causality-aware, quorum-confirmed commitment mechanism closes the window at 94–96% of eventually-consistent baseline throughput. Distributed service protection is thereby repositioned from a development-process discipline applied before deployment into an architectural property of how state is allowed to become visible during execution.
Authors
- Klimova A.
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-12
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24168878
- Primary Topic
- Distributed systems and fault tolerance
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00