Defending ontic structural realism in quantum field theory
Abstract Ontic structural realism (OSR) has been suggested as a metaphysics for quantum field theory (QFT). A common objection to OSR highlights the presence of fundamental intrinsic properties in physical theories (such as QFT) as undermining OSR. As there are purported examples of fundamental intrinsic properties possessed by fields in QFT, OSR is purportedly refuted in QFT (Berghofer, 2018). This article defends OSR from this argument. There are two possible strategies for responding to this argument: (1) denying that Berghofer’s counterexamples to OSR are intrinsic properties, and (2) finding a means of accommodating intrinsic properties in OSR. I consider the first strategy and discuss several possible arguments why the purported cases of fundamental intrinsic properties in QFT are non-intrinsic. Additionally, as there are a number of means available for OSR to accommodate intrinsic properties, the second strategy also succeeds.
Authors
- Amy Meyer (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-9747-7223)
Institutions
- The University of Melbourne (AU)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 2026-11-12
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02650-7
- Primary Topic
- Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- University of Melbourne