Reconstructing Folk Attribution of Consciousness: From Behavior-oriented Intentional Stance to Mind-oriented Conscious Stance

The paper delves into an often-neglected aspect of folk psychology: the folk attribution of consciousness. While the existing view suggests that laypeople attribute conscious mental states by recognizing their phenomenality, the paper argues that this claim lacks empirical support. Instead, I propose shifting the focus to the link between consciousness and having a mind, advocating for a broader understanding of mindreading. This approach distinguishes between behavior-oriented and mind-oriented mindreading, corresponding to the intentional and newly introduced 'conscious stance', respectively. While attributing mental states to explain behavior does not necessarily imply attributing minds, adopting the conscious stance does, as it allows us to explain and predict activities within agents' minds. This novel perspective challenges the conventional understanding of folk attribution of consciousness and opens up new avenues for exploration in folk psychology and consciousness studies.

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Publication Details

Journal
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Published
2026-11-12
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-026-00854-8
Primary Topic
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Reconstructing Folk Attribution of Consciousness: From Behavior-oriented Intentional Stance to Mind-oriented Conscious Stance

Michał Wyrwa
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
article

Reconstructing Folk Attribution of Consciousness: From Behavior-oriented Intentional Stance to Mind-oriented Conscious Stance

Michał Wyrwa
article en

Abstract

The paper delves into an often-neglected aspect of folk psychology: the folk attribution of consciousness. While the existing view suggests that laypeople attribute conscious mental states by recognizing their phenomenality, the paper argues that this claim lacks empirical support. Instead, I propose shifting the focus to the link between consciousness and having a mind, advocating for a broader understanding of mindreading. This approach distinguishes between behavior-oriented and mind-oriented mindreading, corresponding to the intentional and newly introduced 'conscious stance', respectively. While attributing mental states to explain behavior does not necessarily imply attributing minds, adopting the conscious stance does, as it allows us to explain and predict activities within agents' minds. This novel perspective challenges the conventional understanding of folk attribution of consciousness and opens up new avenues for exploration in folk psychology and consciousness studies.

Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań (PL)
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
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