Research on the Implementation Deviation and Correction Mechanism of Local Government Green Energy Promotion Policies

Green energy promotion policies designed by China's central government are carried out mainly by local governments, whose choices determine whether national targets for renewable energy deployment are converted into approved projects, installed capacity, and actual consumption. In practice, local implementation frequently departs from central intentions: targets are diluted, execution lags behind plans, and commitments remain symbolic. Drawing on principal–agent theory, the target responsibility system, and the literature on policy implementation gaps, this study examines whether correction mechanisms, represented by the central environmental protection inspection, reduce the implementation deviation of local green energy promotion policies. An implementation deviation index is constructed from target dilution, execution shortfall, and symbolic implementation, and a difference-in-differences model is estimated on a simulated panel of 281 prefecture-level cities from 2013 to 2022. The results show that being named in the central inspection feedback lowers the deviation index by about 0.057, or roughly 39% of one standard deviation, and the finding survives parallel-trend, propensity score matching, alternative index, sample exclusion, heterogeneity-robust, and placebo tests. Mechanism tests indicate that the correction operates through stronger political accountability, larger fiscal support, heightened public supervision, and a greater weight of green targets in cadre evaluation. The effect is stronger in eastern cities, in non-resource-based cities, and in cities with higher fiscal autonomy and administrative capacity. The study offers implications for designing a coordinated and incentivecompatible correction system for local green energy governance.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Economics Finance and Management Studies
Published
2026-11-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.47191/jefms/v9-i11-18
Primary Topic
Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
Type
article
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article

Research on the Implementation Deviation and Correction Mechanism of Local Government Green Energy Promotion Policies

Dewi Purwati, Yeong Hong Yi
2 links
Journal of Economics Finance and Management Studies
Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
article

Research on the Implementation Deviation and Correction Mechanism of Local Government Green Energy Promotion Policies

Dewi Purwati, Yeong Hong Yi
article en

Abstract

Green energy promotion policies designed by China's central government are carried out mainly by local governments, whose choices determine whether national targets for renewable energy deployment are converted into approved projects, installed capacity, and actual consumption. In practice, local implementation frequently departs from central intentions: targets are diluted, execution lags behind plans, and commitments remain symbolic. Drawing on principal–agent theory, the target responsibility system, and the literature on policy implementation gaps, this study examines whether correction mechanisms, represented by the central environmental protection inspection, reduce the implementation deviation of local green energy promotion policies. An implementation deviation index is constructed from target dilution, execution shortfall, and symbolic implementation, and a difference-in-differences model is estimated on a simulated panel of 281 prefecture-level cities from 2013 to 2022. The results show that being named in the central inspection feedback lowers the deviation index by about 0.057, or roughly 39% of one standard deviation, and the finding survives parallel-trend, propensity score matching, alternative index, sample exclusion, heterogeneity-robust, and placebo tests. Mechanism tests indicate that the correction operates through stronger political accountability, larger fiscal support, heightened public supervision, and a greater weight of green targets in cadre evaluation. The effect is stronger in eastern cities, in non-resource-based cities, and in cities with higher fiscal autonomy and administrative capacity. The study offers implications for designing a coordinated and incentivecompatible correction system for local green energy governance.

Journal of Economics Finance and Management StudiesVol. 09(11)
Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology (CN)
Affordable and clean energy, Climate action, Peace, justice, and strong institutions, Sustainable cities and communities
Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
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