Number and Coverage as Structural Margins for Identifying Cartel Markets in EU Manufacturing
Abstract Competition authorities must choose ex ante where to look for cartels. Market concentration, the usual guide, combines two features acting through different mechanisms: the number of strategically significant firms needed to coordinate, and the share of the market those firms cover. This paper separates the two and asks whether they support a transparent enforcement screen and where that screen stops being informative. The outcome is an established infringement decision rather than the opening of proceedings: of 62 European Commission manufacturing cases, 45 ended in a decision and 23 are analyzed, organized as 630 country-by-industry units across 27 countries and 24 industries. Most cartels span the whole European Economic Area and appear in every member state, so a country holdout leaks the same cartel into training, and the valid design holds out entire industries. Under it the score attains 0.68 ROC and 0.53 precision-recall against a base rate of 0.35; reviewing the top fifth of ranked markets captures a third of infringements at 1.66 times the random rate. It ranks industries but not markets within them, high coverage is not decisive, and no threshold offers a safe harbor. The result is a one-way screen that sharpens targeting within clear limits.
Authors
- Li Shidong (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0008-4679-3532)
Institutions
- North University of China (CN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Research Square
- Published
- 2026-11-12
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11333771/v1
- Primary Topic
- Merger and Competition Analysis
- Type
- preprint