Electoral Systems and Resistance to Democratic Backsliding

We study how electoral institutions affect incentives for elected elites to resist democratic backsliding by a chief executive or party leader. Conventional wisdom suggests that party-centered systems, such as list PR with centralized candidate selection, should weaken co-partisan resistance by making legislators more vulnerable to the leader’s retaliation. Using a formal model, we show that this logic is incomplete: legislators do not solely respond to the electoral cost of resisting but also to the leader’s capacity to retaliate after successful resistance. In candidate-centered systems such as single-member districts with primaries, leaders may still be able to punish dissenters after removal. In party-centered systems, punishment is more severe if the leader survives but weaker if resistance succeeds, in which case the leader loses control over the party. So, party-centered systems produce stronger complementarities in the incentive to resist. We show that equilibrium resistance decreases with the effectiveness of punishment (highest under closed-list PR), but increases with its contingency on the leader’s own survival (highest under centralized candidate selection). As a result, party-centered institutions can generate more co-partisan resistance and offer stronger protection against backsliding.

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Publication Details

Journal
SocArXiv (OSF Preprints)
Published
2026-11-12
DOI
https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/aqst2
Primary Topic
Electoral Systems and Political Participation
Type
preprint
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preprint

Electoral Systems and Resistance to Democratic Backsliding

Sean Gailmard, Carlo Prato, Andrew T. Little
SocArXiv (OSF Preprints)
Electoral Systems and Political Participation
preprint

Electoral Systems and Resistance to Democratic Backsliding

Sean Gailmard, Carlo Prato, Andrew T. Little
preprint en

Abstract

We study how electoral institutions affect incentives for elected elites to resist democratic backsliding by a chief executive or party leader. Conventional wisdom suggests that party-centered systems, such as list PR with centralized candidate selection, should weaken co-partisan resistance by making legislators more vulnerable to the leader’s retaliation. Using a formal model, we show that this logic is incomplete: legislators do not solely respond to the electoral cost of resisting but also to the leader’s capacity to retaliate after successful resistance. In candidate-centered systems such as single-member districts with primaries, leaders may still be able to punish dissenters after removal. In party-centered systems, punishment is more severe if the leader survives but weaker if resistance succeeds, in which case the leader loses control over the party. So, party-centered systems produce stronger complementarities in the incentive to resist. We show that equilibrium resistance decreases with the effectiveness of punishment (highest under closed-list PR), but increases with its contingency on the leader’s own survival (highest under centralized candidate selection). As a result, party-centered institutions can generate more co-partisan resistance and offer stronger protection against backsliding.

SocArXiv (OSF Preprints)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Electoral Systems and Political Participation
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