Electoral Systems and Resistance to Democratic Backsliding
We study how electoral institutions affect incentives for elected elites to resist democratic backsliding by a chief executive or party leader. Conventional wisdom suggests that party-centered systems, such as list PR with centralized candidate selection, should weaken co-partisan resistance by making legislators more vulnerable to the leader’s retaliation. Using a formal model, we show that this logic is incomplete: legislators do not solely respond to the electoral cost of resisting but also to the leader’s capacity to retaliate after successful resistance. In candidate-centered systems such as single-member districts with primaries, leaders may still be able to punish dissenters after removal. In party-centered systems, punishment is more severe if the leader survives but weaker if resistance succeeds, in which case the leader loses control over the party. So, party-centered systems produce stronger complementarities in the incentive to resist. We show that equilibrium resistance decreases with the effectiveness of punishment (highest under closed-list PR), but increases with its contingency on the leader’s own survival (highest under centralized candidate selection). As a result, party-centered institutions can generate more co-partisan resistance and offer stronger protection against backsliding.
Authors
- Sean Gailmard (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1742-5879)
- Carlo Prato (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3643-9707)
- Andrew T. Little (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9911-4291)
Publication Details
- Journal
- SocArXiv (OSF Preprints)
- Published
- 2026-11-12
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/aqst2
- Primary Topic
- Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Type
- preprint