The Camouflage of Gemeinschaft: Asymmetric Objective Functions and Hierarchical Control under Information Hacking
This paper analyzes strategic rent extraction and signaling models in associational societies under information asymmetry. Building on classical sociological concepts of Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft, this study formalizes a three-stage phase transition model using asymmetric objective functions and Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium structures. We demonstrate how rational upper-level actors utilize communal signaling to maintain hierarchical control and extract surplus behind communal rhetoric, and derive the Bayesian observability rank condition required to destabilize this pooling equilibrium.
Authors
- Your Name
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-12
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24150169
- Primary Topic
- Game Theory and Applications
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00