Motivations behind entrepreneurial bribery in the Kyrgyz Republic: examining initiator’s advantage and social norms

Purpose This study aims to examine how micro-entrepreneurs evaluate bribery in a high-corruption transition economy. Focusing on the Kyrgyz Republic, it analyzes two mechanisms shaping entrepreneurs’ evaluative acceptance of bribery: public officials’ initiation of bribe requests, “initiator’s advantage” and perceived social norms among peer entrepreneurs. By integrating resource dependence theory and collective action theory, this study explains how institutional power asymmetries and normative expectations jointly influence entrepreneurs’ evaluative acceptance of bribery in bureaucratic interactions. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a vignette-based factorial survey experiment with a 2 × 2 design. Data were collected from 483 micro-entrepreneurs operating in four major bazaars in Bishkek. Vignettes systematically varied whether a public official initiated a bribe request and whether bribery was described as common among peers. Respondents evaluated the acceptability of a hypothetical entrepreneur’s decision to pay a bribe. Regression analysis was used to estimate treatment effects, with extensive balance checks and subsample analyses. Findings Both information framings significantly increase respondents’ evaluative acceptance of the hypothetical entrepreneur’s decision to pay. Official initiation raises evaluative acceptance modestly, while perceived pro-bribery social norms exert a substantially larger effect. These effects remain robust after controlling for demographic and business characteristics and do not vary by gender, age or education. The interaction between the two framings is not statistically significant. The findings indicate that evaluative acceptance of entrepreneurial bribery is shaped simultaneously by dependence on discretionary officials and by socially reinforced expectations about peer behavior. Originality/value This study provides experimental evidence on entrepreneurial bribery from a post-Soviet transition economy. It advances the literature by integrating resource dependence theory and collective action theory at the microlevel, demonstrating how institutional pressure and social norms shape microentrepreneurs’ evaluations of corrupt exchanges. Methodologically, it moves beyond correlational survey data by isolating causal effects of situational cues using a vignette experiment. The findings highlight that effective anti-corruption policies must address both bureaucratic discretion and entrenched social norms among entrepreneurs.