Unequal Choice Friction Misread as Preference: Why the Options People Take Can Reflect the Effort of Taking Them

This conceptual paper introduces Unequal Choice Friction Misread as Preference, a mechanism in which options remain nominally available but differ in the effort, time, knowledge, or cost required to take them. Uptake shaped by those differences is then attributed solely to preference. The paper asks what each option requires and how uptake changes when effort changes while the options remain fixed. The easier option may also be preferred, and some friction may be justified. Observed choices therefore require assessment alongside the conditions under which they were made. The discussion connects the mechanism to Thaler’s account of sludge. An illustrative case draws on the Federal Trade Commission’s allegations about Amazon’s Prime cancellation process, reporting on internal documents, and Amazon’s public appeal to renewal rates as evidence of value. Continued membership after an incomplete cancellation attempt does not establish a decision to stay. The reported decline in cancellations does not isolate the effect of additional steps from alternative offers. Part of the Power, Permission, and Obligation series within On Human Modeling, the paper examines who sets choice costs and who bears them. Its framework can inform human–AI research on preference inference from engagement, retention, or noncompletion when interface burdens differ across options.