Procurement Competition and Cordination in Perishable Supply Chains: A Game-Theoretic Literature Review

Procurement in perishable supply chains involves securing access to products while preserving their usefulness before deterioration limits utilization. This article examines how competition and coordination influence procurement decisions from a game-theoretic perspective. It adopts a narrative literature review with thematic analysis of selected research identified through Google Scholar and examined using accessible source materials. The synthesis distinguishes buyer-side procurement competition from supplier rivalry, downstream sales competition, and vertical coordination. Five themes organize the analysis: forms and drivers of procurement competition; perishability and information; sourcing and contractual responses; outcomes and distributional trade-offs; and boundary conditions and strength of evidence. The synthesis suggests that scarcity alone does not explain strategic procurement responses. Allocation rules, information ownership, sourcing alternatives, and commitment timing shape incentives, while deterioration, delivery conditions, and preservation costs influence the value retained from acquired quantities. The distinction between nominal and usable supply connects acquisition with product utilization. Contractual coordination can address particular incentive problems without necessarily resolving competition among buyers, and improvements in individual profit do not automatically increase total supply chain surplus or reduce waste. The review contributes a conceptual framework linking procurement conditions, strategic mechanisms, and outcomes. Its implications support evaluating purchasing arrangements through expected usable output, delivery reliability, and risk allocation. Conclusions remain conditional on selective coverage, uneven source access, and heterogeneous research settings. Future research should connect allocation decisions, ordering behavior, delivered freshness, and contractual risk sharing within observed procurement relationships.