Unequal Exit Costs and Bargaining Exposure: Why the Same Disagreement Can Cost Two People Different Things

This conceptual paper introduces Unequal Exit Costs and Bargaining Exposure, a mechanism through which unequal alternatives and losses from leaving change what disagreement costs each participant. The same negotiation can place housing, income, community, or essential support at risk for one party while leaving the other with a stronger fallback. The paper distinguishes accepting terms from judging them fair or accepting them on equal footing. Assessment requires evidence about available alternatives, what each party would lose by leaving, and who can change those alternatives. Unequal exposure does not by itself establish coercion, wrongdoing, or an invalid agreement. The discussion connects the mechanism to Emerson’s account of power and dependence and examines the United States Strike Commission’s findings on the 1894 Pullman strike, as excerpted by the Illinois State Museum. The case contrasts workers’ linked housing and employment risks with the company’s ability to close its shops and wait. The findings do not establish what every worker would have chosen with better alternatives. Part of the Power, Permission, and Obligation series within On Human Modeling, the paper asks who can leave and what an agreement establishes about the conditions of acceptance. Its framework can inform human–AI research on interpreting user acceptance in light of dependence, switching costs, and available alternatives.