Elite Capture and Control in Participatory Budgeting: Evidence from a Sri Lankan Municipality

This study aims to examine how elite capture and elite control shape PB practices in a Sri Lankan local government, with a focus on how accounting mediates these practices. In particular, this explores how political and administrative elites utilise the PB process to dominate in the field during their respective leadership periods. To achieve the study’s aims, a qualitative case study was conducted in a Sri Lankan municipality, one of the earliest adopters of PB in the country. Data were collected through 24 semi-structured interviews with elected and administrative officials, complemented by document evidence and informal discussions. Data were thematically analysed, drawing on the concepts of elite capture and control. The study reveals cyclical shifts in PB across leadership phases. Under political leadership, PB was dominated by political capture, with politicised committees, patron–client allocations, and contract manipulation, supported by accounting practices such as priorities, tender thresholds, and budget reallocations. Under administrative leadership, elite control intensified, as administrators employed templates, technical feasibility, and reallocation rules. In both phases, accounting practices, far from being neutral, functioned as instruments that enabled elites to dominate their power and authority. The study contributes to accounting literature by demonstrating how calculative practices are implicated in elite capture and control. It extends debates on participatory accounting by providing an Asian perspective on how reforms designed to empower citizens may instead reinforce elite power.