Security in MEDA-Based Biochips: A New Hardware Based Technique for Detection, Prevention, and Rectification of Cyber Physical Attacks

Recent advancements in microelectrode-dot-array (MEDA) based biochips have significantly reshaped the landscape of Lab-on-chip devices. By integrating concepts from computer-aided design automation and cyber-physical systems, these innovations enhance ease of use, throughput, and reliability. Nevertheless, a notable security concern in MEDA-based biochips lies in their vulnerability to actuation tampering attacks, which aim to disrupt the control sequence in the daisy chain input, resulting in erroneous bioassays. In this paper, we identify actuation tampering attacks specific to MEDA-based biochips and propose a technique to detect and safeguard against such attacks. This method vigilantly monitors for malicious activities and can halt operations upon detecting any anomalies. Our hardware-based approach identifies the tampering sequence, rectifies it, processes it through the daisy-chained structure, and ultimately verifies the output pattern, accepting or rejecting the result based on the status of the associated hardware flags. By addressing these security challenges, our technique ensures the reliability and integrity of MEDA-based biochips in biomedical applications.