Evolutionary Game-Theory for Decision Making in Maritime Transport Under Multiple Contradictory Goals

Sanctions, interdiction, and intensified monitoring can alter the routes used in maritime transport. This study examines how increasing enforcement intensity affects maritime routing in the long run and over finite adaptation horizons. A three-strategy evolutionary game represents short, intermediate, and long routes through population shares governed by replicator dynamics. Enforcement intensity enters as an external parameter. The analysis identifies regime boundaries at which the payoff ordering of competing routes changes. In the reference scenario, the short route loses payoff dominance at λc=0.275 and the long route becomes dominant above λML≃0.367, producing a sequential reorganization from short to intermediate and long routes as enforcement pressure increases. An indirect-routing share and its sensitivity measure the finite-time response alongside the long-run payoff thresholds. Numerical simulations show gradual adjustment toward payoff-dominant strategies. With symmetric initial shares and T=20, sensitivity peaks at λ*=0.2457, below the first payoff threshold; its location depends on the horizon and initial composition. A complementary static strategic formulation identifies conditions under which active enforcement becomes preferable to passive monitoring as a function of route-specific interdiction risk. The predictions are conditional on the payoff assumptions and remain to be tested against observed shipping decisions.