CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY WITHIN THE INDONESIAN STATE SYSTEM FOLLOWING THE AMENDMENTS TO THE 1945 CONSTITUTIONMOODY RIZQY

This study examines how popular sovereignty operates alongside the rule of law and constitutional supremacy in Indonesia after the 1999–2002 amendments to the 1945 Constitution. It asks what forms popular sovereignty takes in Indonesia’s constitutional democracy and how limits on power, checks and balances, human rights guarantees, and citizen participation sustain that democracy. Using normative juridical research with conceptual and statutory approaches, it focuses on Article 1(2) and (3) and related provisions. The People’s Consultative Assembly is no longer the sole holder of sovereignty; sovereignty now flows through elections, direct presidential elections, the House of Representatives and the Regional Representative Council, and constitutional review by the Constitutional Court. Elections alone therefore cannot measure democratic quality. Limits on power, mutual institutional control, protected rights, and meaningful participation must work together to keep state power accountable and within constitutional bounds.