DE JURE FEDERALISM, DE FACTO CENTRALIZATION: RETHINKING THE CONSTRAINTS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY IN NIGERIA

While the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria acknowledges local governments as a democratically elected third tier of government, practice differs. Appointed caretaker committees replace local government chairpersons, and state-based service commissions manage local personnel, while the State/Local Government Joint Account controls local government revenue. This article argues that this de jure-de facto discrepancy is not a failure of implementation, but a deliberate part of Nigeria's constitutional design and a structural feature maintained by political incentives to control at the state level. The article uses a framework of fiscal federalism, decentralization theory, and historical institutionalism to trace the constitutional and historical origins of local government dependency. It explains the mechanisms through which the centre can exert fiscal, political, and administrative control. It draws comparative lessons from the constitutional and historical development of local government dependency in South Africa, through a locally established municipal sphere, and in India, through the Panchayati Raj. It then considers the Supreme Court of Nigeria's judgment in Attorney General of the Federation v Attorney General of Abia State (2024), which confirmed direct disbursement of funds to local councils and delegitimised caretaker committees, and submits that the judgment is a necessary but not sufficient foundation for reform. The article ends with a reform agenda which is based on three enforceable conditions: fiscal alignment, electoral integrity, and administrative independence, but also puts the Nigeria case in perspective of broader discussion of hybrid decentralisation in developing federations.