Political Elites Clientelism and Intergroup Relations in Indonesia’s 2024 Presidential Election through a Socio Psychological Lens

Abstract This study examines how political elites understand hierarchy, organizational identity, intergroup relations, and clientelistic practices during Indonesia’s 2024 Presidential Election. Drawing on Social Dominance Theory, Social Identity Theory, and Deutsch’s Theory of Cooperation and Competition as interpretive frameworks, the study employed in-depth interviews with 10 political elites representing major parties associated with the three presidential candidate pairs. Thematic analysis identified three interrelated patterns. First, political competition strengthened organizational identity, cadre formation, loyalty, and hierarchical continuity, illustrating how organizational cohesion may simultaneously support political stability and reproduce unequal power relations. Second, intergroup boundaries among political elites remained adaptive, with intense electoral competition followed by post-election cooperation shaped by shared interests, interpersonal relationships, and pragmatic adjustment. Third, clientelism operated as a relational mechanism of political power in which reciprocity, loyalty, trust, and resource distribution sustained enduring political networks. These findings suggest that elite political behaviour cannot be adequately explained through institutional incentives alone. Instead, political power is reproduced through the interaction of organizational identity, hierarchy, adaptive intergroup relations, and relational exchange. The study contributes a socio-psychological perspective to understanding elite politics and democratic governance in transitional democracies.