Dissolving the Free Will Problem and the Hahn Problem: Two Category Mistakes in Theoretical Framing

Abstract This paper argues that the free will–determinism debate and the Hahn problem in monetary theory are not deep problems but mis-framed ones. In each case, a framework is asked to deliver a result it was never designed to deliver, and the framework’s failure is then attributed to the problem’s depth rather than to the mismatch between the demand and the framework’s capacities. For free will, the mistake consists in treating a first-person practical concept and a third-person descriptive concept as predicates of the same logical kind, and then demanding a single theory to adjudicate between them. This diagnosis is distinguished from, and shown to be compatible with, the strongest existing positions: Fischer and Ravizza’s guidance control, Pereboom’s manipulation argument, Mele’s luck objection, and Strawson’s reactive attitudes. For the Hahn problem, the mistake consists in treating the Arrow–Debreu model as having committed itself to guaranteeing money’s positive value, when the model is explicitly a single-transaction moneyless barter economy. The zero-value equilibrium depends on exogenously given expectations, as Grandmont and Younes established, and Starr’s proposed solution requires elaborating the model with structures the original framework does not contain. The paper defends the parallel against three objections, specifies the methodological tradition—Wittgensteinian dissolution, distinguished from eliminativism and fictionalism—within which the argument operates, and draws out consequences for legal responsibility and monetary theory pedagogy.