Because They Are (Like) Us : On Schopenhauer’s Pioneering Role in Animal Ethics and His Contribution to the Contemporary Debate

Abstract Schopenhauer can be considered the first Western philosopher who, throughout all of his philosophical works, recognizes animals as a significant part of ethics. His notion of compassion ( Mitleid ) as the only basis for morally praiseworthy human conduct renders compassion for animals just as morally valuable as compassion for humans. Schopenhauer’s non-normative and non-prescriptive moral philosophy considers their will to life to be the key characteristic that makes humans and animals essentially the same. This allows us to bridge the human–animal divide without disputing potential differences in their abilities to reason, speak, or have interests, their capacity to feel pleasure or pain, or their sense of the future. For Schopenhauer, the origin of compassion and the impulse to act based on it do not spring from moral considerations, reasoning, or calculating, but from one’s own disposition ( Gesinnung ). His perspective therefore has strong parallels with many ethics of care approaches, without making care a moral imperative. In addition, Schopenhauer’s view of animals as “today’s slaves” creates an opportunity to find common ground between the opposing standpoints of contemporary political animal ethics. This includes the voices that often identify as liberationist/abolitionist and those that are often disparagingly labelled as only welfarist.