Lawfulness, Uniformity and Determinism Between Neo-Kantianism and Logical Empiricism

Abstract Scientific knowledge is based on the idea that nature is not completely chaotic, but follows certain laws. This paper examines how this presupposition, termed the “principle of lawfulness”, is formulated within Marburg neo-Kantianism. After outlining the central role that this notion plays in the work of Cohen, Natorp and Cassirer, focusing especially on the latter, I identify the recurring aspects that the neo-Kantians explicitly associate with lawfulness – namely, the determination of objectivity, objecthood, and the structural features of reality through lawful functional relations. The paper then contrasts their accounts with Schlick’s use of the same notion within a neopositivist framework. This comparison clarifies the relationship between the assumption of lawfulness, the principle of uniformity and causal determinism. On this basis, I argue that lawfulness in neo-Kantianism can be reconstructed as rule-conformity . While lawfulness as a fundamental presupposition does not require accepting the neo-Kantian system as a whole, I argue that the neo-Kantians had good reasons for distinguishing it from causal determinism, in opposition to Schlick’s interpretation.