Adoption of blockchain technology and quality testing in agricultural supply chains: addressing cascade threat and moral hazard

This paper studies the implications of cascade threats and moral hazard in a multi-source, multi-echelon agricultural supply chain consisting of farmers, a collector, and a buyer. Using a game-theoretic model, we analyse and compare three scenarios: one without a blockchain-enabled traceability system (Scenario N) and two with the traceability system, without and with a cost-sharing contract (Scenarios B and BS). We show that blockchain traceability expands production by mitigating cascade threats, yet it can also lower equilibrium product quality. This finding challenges the common assumption that transparency automatically improves quality. Quality declines when the cascade-threat-mitigation effect dominates the moral-hazard-mitigation effect, which occurs when testing is costly or the potential market is small. When testing is inexpensive and the potential market is large, blockchain instead improves quality. To address the quality decline, we introduce a cost-sharing contract that motivates farmers to improve quality. The contract raises all members' expected profits as the sharing ratio increases and makes adoption more attractive to the buyer. However, whether it restores quality to its level without traceability depends on the testing cost and the potential market size. The main results are robust to farmer-specific quality decisions, scenario-dependent testing intensities, and an endogenously designed contract.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
International Journal of Production Research
Published
2026-11-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2026.2764957
Primary Topic
Supply Chain and Inventory Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
article

Adoption of blockchain technology and quality testing in agricultural supply chains: addressing cascade threat and moral hazard

Yacine Rekik, Khaled Hadj-Hamou, Qing Li
3 links
International Journal of Production Research
Supply Chain and Inventory Management
article

Adoption of blockchain technology and quality testing in agricultural supply chains: addressing cascade threat and moral hazard

Yacine Rekik, Khaled Hadj-Hamou, Qing Li
article en

Abstract

This paper studies the implications of cascade threats and moral hazard in a multi-source, multi-echelon agricultural supply chain consisting of farmers, a collector, and a buyer. Using a game-theoretic model, we analyse and compare three scenarios: one without a blockchain-enabled traceability system (Scenario N) and two with the traceability system, without and with a cost-sharing contract (Scenarios B and BS). We show that blockchain traceability expands production by mitigating cascade threats, yet it can also lower equilibrium product quality. This finding challenges the common assumption that transparency automatically improves quality. Quality declines when the cascade-threat-mitigation effect dominates the moral-hazard-mitigation effect, which occurs when testing is costly or the potential market is small. When testing is inexpensive and the potential market is large, blockchain instead improves quality. To address the quality decline, we introduce a cost-sharing contract that motivates farmers to improve quality. The contract raises all members' expected profits as the sharing ratio increases and makes adoption more attractive to the buyer. However, whether it restores quality to its level without traceability depends on the testing cost and the potential market size. The main results are robust to farmer-specific quality decisions, scenario-dependent testing intensities, and an endogenously designed contract.

International Journal of Production Research
Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (FR), Université Lumière Lyon 2 (FR), Institut National des Sciences Appliquées de Lyon (FR), École de management de Lyon (FR)
Zero hunger, Responsible consumption and production
Supply Chain and Inventory Management
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Laika access coming soon
Adoption of blockchain technology and quality testing in agricultural supply chains: addressing cascade threat and moral hazard — Yacine Rekik, Khaled Hadj-Hamou, et al. · International Journal of Production Research (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS