Rebel governance and civilian protection in eastern Congo: a comparative subnational analysis of political order and violence outcomes

It argues that protection outcomes are not a simple function of whether a rebel group governs, but of how it governs: the extent to which a group institutionalises its rule through predictable taxation, dispute resolution and enforceable limits on its own fighters. The article specifies three governance configurations—extractive, institutionalised and fragmented—and derives propositions linking each to distinct patterns of civilian targeting, displacement and civilian-initiated reporting. Because no original subnational data are analysed here, the argument is developed as a comparative theoretical synthesis that draws on the established literature on rebel governance, political order and civilian victimisation, and it specifies the observable implications that a subnational comparative design would need to test. The framework's contribution is to shift the explanatory question from group attributes to governance practices, and to identify the conditions under which institutionalised rebel rule can produce protection dividends that are real but bounded, reversible and unevenly distributed.