Countering populist radical-right parties: the institutional foundations of strategic voting, forced mobility, and party coordination in France and Germany

Abstract This paper investigates how institutional configurations shape strategic voting, forced mobility, and party coordination against populist radical right parties (PRRPs). As PRRPs expand their electoral support across Europe, voters and parties increasingly coordinate to prevent them from gaining power, but the forms and feasibility of such coordination vary across political systems. We argue that electoral systems, party-system structure, and type of democracy jointly shape the incentives and opportunities for electoral coordination and strategic voting. Drawing on France and Germany as theory-building cases, we distinguish strategic voting – the deliberate abandonment of a preferred viable option in a contest involving at least three viable alternatives – from forced mobility in second-round runoffs and party coordination through candidate withdrawals and electoral alliances. In France, two-round legislative elections create repeated opportunities for strategic voting, forced mobility, and party coordination, while the fluid party system and semi-presidentialism facilitate voter realignment. In Germany, the mixed-member proportional electoral system, a more structured party system, and a durable cordon sanitaire around the AfD reduce the need and scope for large-scale strategic voting among voters.