Guiding Stakeholder Behaviour in Photovoltaic Module Recycling: An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Policy Thresholds and Policy Efficiency

ABSTRACT The rapid global deployment of photovoltaic (PV) systems has created growing sustainability challenges associated with end‐of‐life PV modules. This study investigates the determinants of PV module recycling and examines how policy interventions influence stakeholders' strategic choices and expected total payoffs. We develop a three‐player evolutionary game model involving PV equipment producers (PEPs), PV waste recyclers (PWRs), and PV plants to capture their complex strategic interactions. Without policy intervention, the system does not converge to a stable equilibrium. Instead, it exhibits persistent cyclical dynamics, with relatively low proportions of PEPs and PWRs adopting proactive recycling strategies. Sensitivity analysis shows that reducing extended producer responsibility (EPR) compliance costs and increasing baseline benefits for PEPs can promote cooperation among all three parties. Benefit‐sharing mechanisms can reshape cooperation patterns. The policy analysis reveals that subsidies, recycling quotas, and Pigouvian taxes can each shift cooperation patterns and encourage responsible recycling. Stakeholders' expected total payoffs do not necessarily peak at the thresholds that trigger strategic transitions. Rather, they are jointly determined by the structure of cooperation and the design of policy incentives.